Will the Sahel be the next Afghanistan?

Even before it was over, it started all over again. Even before the departure of the last American soldier from Afghanistan, the armed group Islamic State, rival of the Taliban, claimed responsibility for a bloody bombing at Kabul airport. The attack left nearly 100 dead (including 13 marines) and hundreds injured.

Two weeks earlier, on August 18, 80 people, including fifteen gendarmes, were killed in attack on a military convoy escorting civilians in the north of Burkina Faso. Like its neighbors, Mali and Niger, the small African country has regularly suffered deadly outbreaks for years. The raids have killed 1,500 people and more than a million refugees since 2015.

Will the rest of the world go in this direction again and always terrorist? How will jihadism continue globally, and in Africa in particular? What lessons should we learn from the failures of interventions and occupations in the Middle East for Western strategy in Africa?

Professor Bruno Charbonneau, of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, doubts that the Sahel will now become a kind of African copy of Afghanistan or Iraq. He also doesn’t think the West will get bogged down there like they did in Kandahar, Kabul or Baghdad.

“You often hear big statements about the links between terrorist groups in the Middle East and the Sahel, but the links are rather tenuous, in reality,” says one who has studied the dynamics of this region for years. “If these links exist, I do not see the proof and I do not know them. Of course, connections can exist in general, ideologically and in the media. But very concrete links? Direct? No. “

Patience and carnage

A specialist in security and conflict issues in French-speaking Africa, Professor Charbonneau heads the FrancoPaix center, linked to the Raoul-Dandurand Chair at UQAM. And, according to him, even the links between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the original al-Qaeda organization are “relatively thin”.

All in all, if it is necessary to establish reconciliations between terrorist or insurrectionary movements, it makes them in part – and in part only – with Boko Haram, this rigorous, violent, ferocious and anti-Western group which operates in Nigeria and in certain areas of Niger, Chad and Mali. “The links are regional,” explains the professor. There are points of contact with groups in Algeria or Libya, for example. But strong relations with the Taliban? I don’t see the evidence. “

Having said this over and over again, the reconstitution of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the decisive victory of the Taliban against the Americans and their allies (including the Canadians) obviously whip up the spirits of the insurgent troops in Africa. “There is an effect, but the struggles in the region have been going on for decades, nuance Mr. Charbonneau. The groups present in the Sahel are betting on the long term. They have shown resilience and patience since the start of their fight. There, we can make a connection with the Taliban strategy, which applies constant pressure to make the opponent bored. “

This strategy of waiting and carnage succeeded in defeating the most powerful army in the world: the lesson will certainly bear fruit. “Specialists and commentators in the media say that this is the end of Western military interventions,” notes Professor Charbonneau. Perhaps, indeed, the Afghanistan-style interventions are over. I think the lesson will encourage [les Occidentaux] to stay in the Sahel, but with less direct participation, more from a distance. “

“This trend has started. French troops [dans la région] have been using many more drones in the past year. Remotely controlled air strikes provide tactical support to national armies. The French also provide equipment and intelligence services to their local allies. This containment strategy seeks to contain conflicts and their effects rather than directly combating them.

In the Sahel, “it’s a mess”

In the Sahel, armed clashes affect five countries: Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. The very designation of what exactly happens there seems very complicated, proof of the muddle of the situation. Both specialists and the media speak of war, Islamist insurgency and jihadist insurgency.

“I myself have a little trouble using terms that are cast in stone,” admits Professor Charbonneau. Especially since the conflict has evolved a lot since the beginnings in northern Mali, in 2012. A Tuareg independence insurgency was transformed when the extremist jihadist groups appeared after September 11 gained the upper hand in the rebellion movement. The conflict then became regionalized and France intervened militarily. From 2015, Niger and Burkina were affected. “

The picture becomes more complicated when we add the effect of inter-community violence, of a quasi-civil war. “It is therefore a mixture of rebellion, insurrection and civil war: it is really difficult to characterize the thing”, summarizes Mr. Charbonneau.

Two main entities are active in the region: first, the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), founded in 2017 by Iyad Ag Ghali, a Malian Tuareg in rebellion since the 1990s and now in the head of this radicalized coalition; then the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (EIGS), a constellation of jihadist movements of Salafist persuasion which has its roots in Nigeria. These two groups have already collaborated, but they have been fighting each other for about a year.

We must add other more or less strong groups and states with armies with changing allegiances (and sometimes found guilty of abuses). Mali has just suffered two coups d’état in nine months. We must also rely on UN peace operations, 6 of the 12 peacekeeping operations being deployed in Africa at the moment. More than 200 UN soldiers have died in Mali since the start of the UN mission (MINUSMA). And then there is the European military presence – especially French, in fact -, which carries out traditional operations there, supplies equipment to its allies, bombs here and there.

We therefore find ourselves with civil wars on one side and international interventions on the other, in a context of fierce inter-community struggles. All in regions left to the mercy of militias, bands of bandits and vengeful raids.

“If I may use the expression, it is clear that this is a mess,” said the professor. Everything gets mixed up and the current problem is not [de savoir] where to start, but who to talk to to negotiate deals. France refuses talks with groups it identifies as terrorists. “

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