Sanctions are an important and powerful weapon, and they are putting some pressure on the Kremlin. But unless the West uses them judiciously, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who seems to believe his paranoid propaganda and commands the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, may conclude that his regime has nothing to lose.
MADRID.– The images that were published after the Russian withdrawal from Bucha – where Ukraine accuses Russian soldiers of torturing and killing civilians – intensified pressure on the West to provide more offensive weapons to Ukraine and for Europe to ban the import of energy from Russia. But leaving aside the legitimate question of Europe’s willingness to pay for Ukraine, the stark reality is that sanctions are not always effective.
The calls for sanctions began long before the invasion. As Russia built up troops near the Ukrainian border, the Ukrainian government (and some US lawmakers) called on the United States and Europe to impose preemptive sanctions and provide stronger security guarantees for kyiv. But Western leaders refused, saying sanctions would prevent the parties from reaching a diplomatic solution.
In geopolitics -as in life- everything looks clearer in retrospect: we now know that diplomatic efforts were in vain. What we do not know is whether pre-emptive sanctions would have upset Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans, especially since they probably would not have been as severe as the package of measures that was imposed after the invasion.
That package, after all, represents the most comprehensive and coordinated punitive action taken against a major power since World War II. After its initial reservation, the European Union joined the United States initiative, and in a matter of days they took measures to exclude Russian banks from the international financial system. The West also froze much of the Russian central bank’s foreign exchange reserves, an unprecedented move that will have caused alarm in China, whose official reserves total $3.25 trillion. And in recent days, the European Union has already put new sanctions on the Moscow regime under consideration, where a veto on Russian energy sources stands out.
At first, it seemed that the sanctions were having the desired effect: in less than a week, the ruble was devalued by a third against the dollar. The free fall of the stock price forced the authorities to suspend operations on the Moscow stock exchange for almost a month. Forecasts indicate that Russian GDP will contract between 10 and 15% this year.
But, as has been seen, although the sanctions are increasing, it seems that the Russian markets are already stabilizing: thanks to a determined intervention by the authorities. The ruble is already trading almost at pre-war prices and the stock market has recovered part of its losses. With the violence showing no signs of abating, Western governments must be clear about what sanctions can (and can’t) achieve—and how much sacrifice their societies will accept.
Sanctions have been a foreign policy tool for 2,500 years: they first appeared in the Peloponnesian wars. They have become more sophisticated and complex over time, but the basic mechanism is the same: inflict enough economic damage on the recipient to change their behavior.
Researchers at Drexel University, after an exhaustive historical analysis of the use of sanctions, deduced that they fully achieved their objectives in only 35% of cases. They have been most effective – for example, in apartheid South Africa – when used in combination with other measures to further a particular foreign policy goal.
Moreover, even the most targeted sanctions and asset freezes are of little use against autocracies. From North Korea to Iran, dictatorial regimes shield themselves and their friends from economic harm through complex mechanisms. The Putin regime has proven very adept at ensuring that sanctions do not affect it.
Those who are paying the price of sanctions are ordinary Russians. And, contrary to what some in the West hope, this is unlikely to bring about Putin’s downfall. Dictators are not very vulnerable to changes in public opinion. And there are no indications of any imminent revolution; even less with the growing repression by the Kremlin and its powerful propaganda machine.
According to Putin’s narrative, with the “cancellation” of Russian culture and increasing “unprovoked” attacks on the country’s economy, the West is trying to destroy Russia – just as the Russian leader had been warning. Those in Russia who oppose the “special military operation” in Ukraine are “traitors” or “mosquitoes”, capable of “selling their own mother”.
Since there are no independent media left to dispute this account, it seems that most Russians have been won over. A recent survey by the Levada Center indicates that 83% of Russians are in favor of Putin’s actions in Ukraine (in January the figure was 69%): it is a significant fact, without prejudice to the complexities of the Russian reality.
While the Putin regime has insulated itself from the impact of sanctions, Europe faces high costs. In an economically interdependent world like today’s, the use of sanctions involves serious damage to both parties. Although the economies of the West do not depend on Russia in a general way, Europe buys a good part of the energy it consumes. For this reason, while the United States Congress has approved a total embargo on Russian energy imports, the EU -initially- had only focused on coal, leaving oil and gas aside, although it has been changing its position with the passing of the weeks.
A comprehensive ban on energy imports from Russia to Europe will undoubtedly increase the pressure on the Kremlin. But it is a decision that must be made with caution. As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently warned, the economic and social costs of a sudden embargo would be immense. Ridding Europe of dependence on Russian natural gas, without affecting European social and economic stability, will take time.
Sanctions must be an integral part of a broader negotiating strategy. When the West has deployed its most powerful economic weapons, it will have no influence left. It is necessary to leave room to scale the response to Putin’s actions, especially if it involves the use of tactical chemical or nuclear weapons.
It is clear that the West’s arsenal in Ukraine is limited. Sanctions are an important and powerful weapon, and they are putting undoubted pressure on the Kremlin. But given their limitations (and the costs to the West and the Russian population), they must be used judiciously. Otherwise, Putin – who appears to have internalized his own paranoid propaganda and controls the world’s largest nuclear warehouse – might decide he has nothing to lose.
The author
She was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain and Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group; she is currently a visiting professor at Georgetown University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate 1995 – 2022