Since then, however, African criticism of Russia has been muted, especially at the UN, where the continent’s 54 votes can change resolutions. Just over half of African states voted in favor of the March 2 UN resolution condemning the invasion; 17 abstained, eight chose not to vote at all. Eritrea, along with Belarus, North Korea, Syria and Russia itself, voted against. Despite diplomatic efforts by the US and its allies to rally African opinion against Russia, more countries have climbed the fence: 33 abstained or did not vote on an April 7 resolution to suspend Russia from UN human rights council.
The reasons for the reluctance to censor Russia range from the historical to the pragmatic. The colonial past cited by Kimani informs a general wariness towards exhortations from the West. Dim memories of Soviet support for newly independent African states in the 1960s and 1970s encourage some sympathy for Moscow.
The more recent deepening of economic relations also plays a role: although Russia is no longer a significant contributor of development aid to Africa, and only a minor source of direct investment, it has become a major supplier of food and, especially in last. few years, an increasingly important provider of military assistance.
Read: How a sanctioned Russian company gained access to Sudanese gold
But these ties now put Africa in a bind. The refusal to take a position not only represents a moral hazard, it offers no protection against the repercussions of war. African nations are already suffering economically as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; political pain will inevitably follow.
The war has isolated Africa from two main sources of grain. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, 14 African nations depend on Russia and Ukraine for half their wheat, with Eritrea (100%), Somalia (over 90%) and Egypt (nearly 75%) leading the pack. ready. Overall, wheat imports account for 90% of Africa’s $4bn trade with Russia and almost 50% of its $4.5bn trade with Ukraine, according to the African Development Bank. In an interview with Al Jazeera, the bank’s president, Akinwumi Adesina, warned of a growing food crisis that could “destabilize the continent.”
In addition to reducing wheat supplies, the war has caused prices of a wide range of staples to rise, fueling inflation even as nations struggle to recover from two years of economic suffering caused by the coronavirus pandemic. . This poses a threat to governments throughout the developing world, but especially in Africa, which is already experiencing a democratic retreat and a resurgence of military coups.
The war is also drawing the attention of the developed world to Ukraine, making it nearly impossible for African nations to get desperately needed additional assistance. Unsurprisingly, economists covering Africa at the World Bank are predicting more civil unrest to come.
It is the greatest irony that the prospect of civil unrest, itself a consequence of Russia’s actions elsewhere, will fuel African demand for Russian services of a different kind. For many governments, the ammunition and manpower provided by Moscow are the tools they need to suppress political dissent and defeat an uneasy population.
The most potent of these weapons are the mercenaries of the Wagner Group, the Kremlin’s notorious private army for hire. Having first emerged in 2014 as an auxiliary to the Russian military during the annexation of Crimea, the organization has become a tool for Putin’s outreach to despots and autocrats across Africa. Wagner is led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close ties to Putin.
The Russian mercenaries, most of them military veterans, fought for several years for rebel general Khalifa Haftar in Libya and supported the government in the Central African Republic. More recently, Wagner fighters have appeared in Mozambique, Sudan, Madagascar, and Mali. (The group is also active in Syria.)
The withdrawal of French forces from the fight against jihadist groups in the Sahel, the belt of countries south of the Sahara, represents more opportunities for Prigozhin, especially since many of those countries are now run by military junta. Wagner’s fighters have not always been successful against terrorists: in Mozambique, for example, Russian contractors fled in the face of sustained attacks by Islamist militias. But Wagner’s fighters’ propensity for extreme violence and disregard for the rules of war, never mind niceties like human rights, make them attractive to regimes seeking to crush political resistance. In return, Prigozhin is happy to accept mining rights to minerals, such as gold in Sudan.
Putin’s war represents both a short-term challenge and a long-term opportunity for Wagner. He has been forced to send fighters from Africa to Ukraine and will have a hard time coping with any increase in demand from African states. But Prigozhin will also be able to recruit from the ranks of battle-hardened Russian soldiers.
African countries may sit on the fence about the war in Ukraine, but they will be its victims for years to come.
More from other writers at Bloomberg Opinion:
Putin’s autarchy option is between Stalin and Hitler: Leonid Bershidsky
Putin is losing, so this is how the war will get worse: Andreas Kluth
Some countries belong to the fringe of Cold War 2: Hal Brands
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or of Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Bobby Ghosh is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion who covers foreign affairs. A former editor-in-chief of the Hindustan Times, he was managing editor of Quartz and international editor of Time magazine.
More stories like this are available at bloomberg.com/opinion
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