As the dust settles on the recent exchange of arms between Iran and Israel, an initial assessment is necessary. Six months of escalation, during which the region teetered on the edge of the abyss, now seem to be leading to a fragile truce. But what appears to be a return to a logic of indirect confrontation could lead to deleterious consequences.
The months that have passed since Hamas’s “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation on October 7, 2023, have been marked by the intensification of the “shadow war” between Israel and Iran. for several years. Between January and March 2024, several officers of the Quds Force, the expeditionary branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were eliminated by Israeli army (IDF) aviation. 1er In April, this systematic targeting reached its first climax with the bombing of the Iranian diplomatic representation in Damascus and the death of several officials of the Quds Force in the Levant. Since the strikes against its embassy can be interpreted, by virtue of the principle of extraterritoriality, as a direct aggression against Iran, Tehran cannot remain impassive without risking harm to its credibility on the domestic, regional or international level.
On the night of April 13 to 14, 2024, the Islamic Republic launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles against Israeli territory. For the first time in 45 years, Iran is directly attacking the Jewish state, from its own territory, without going through its partners in the “axis of resistance” – a regional network of influence orchestrated by Tehran and composed of non-state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. The attack aims in particular to restore the Iranian image, heavily tarnished since October 2023.
After the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, Iran refused to directly support Hamas, even if it meant undermining its status as champion of the Palestinian cause and the “anti-Zionist struggle”, thus appearing particularly pusillanimous, even resigned, in the eyes of his proxies of the “axis of resistance”.
In mid-April, while the White House warned that it would neither support nor condone an Israeli punitive expedition, the Iranians, believing that they had shown sufficient firmness against the Jewish state, hoped that “the case is closed” and that the ball will remain in the Israeli court. However, this meant taking into account the law of retaliation and the desire of the Netanyahu government to endure the Iranian affront while diverting the attention of international public opinion from the crisis in Gaza.
On the night of April 18 to 19, Israel launched several missiles at an air base in Isfahan responsible for protecting two nuclear installations of the Iranian program, including that of Natanz. The Israeli message is twofold. On the one hand, it is a question of demonstrating the technological superiority of the Israeli army and its capacity to penetrate deep into Iranian territory under the noses of the mullahs. On the other hand, the aim is to illustrate the inability of the IRGC to defend Iran.
Unlike the IDF and its anti-aircraft dome which had managed to intercept 99% of Iranian projectiles, the Pasdaran were not able to destroy the missiles probably launched remotely using MALE drones and supported by F- stealth fighters. 35.
In the aftermath of the Israeli response and while the international community holds its breath, the Hebrew State and the Islamic Republic suddenly and simultaneously walled themselves in silence: choosing not to claim responsibility for the attack, the Israeli government even refused to comment on it. In doing so, it once again allows the Islamic regime to save face by minimizing the scope of the strikes and denying the fact that they could have come from outside.
Opening with a phase of de-escalation, this sequence augurs a return to the “shadow war” between Israel and Iran – an indirect struggle which nevertheless promises to now be fought more bitterly on both sides – through more systematic use of cyber tools, targeted assassinations, sabotage and the use of proxies pro-Iranians. Above all, we must expect the Islamic regime to accelerate its nuclear program, its leaders being more aware than ever of the inanity of conventional means to protect Iranian territory.
The Israeli strategy to contain the Iranian regime by neutralizing and dismantling its system of proxies could indeed encourage the Iranians to turn inward and seek to ensure the security of their fortress and the survival of the Islamic regime by other means. If Israel persists in weakening Iran’s regional relays (such as the Hachd al-Chaabi forces in Iraq), the latter could be pushed to compensate for its loss of strategic depth by strengthening its nuclear deterrence. In other words, Israel would be trading the relatively controllable threat posed by these non-state actors for a much more serious threat, that of an atomic-armed Iran.
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reference: www.lapresse.ca