“We don’t have it or use it; and do not ask me to deny for others & rdquor ;, says an executive from the Ministry of the Interior when asked these days by Pegasus. At this point in the case, no one has yet denied the use of Israeli mobile attack software by the Spanish intelligence services during the outbreak of the processdespite the fact that, as one of the police sources of Information questioned recalls, “there may be tests of the use of Pegasus, but there are none of who it was; Y about him process Spain was interested… and France, and Russia, and the United Statesthe United Kingdom, Germany, even Morocco & rdquor ;.
In this circle with no way out, suspicions about espionage on pro-independence leaders roll around, after Defense, the ministry that administers the CNI, emphatically underlined that “the Government does not work outside the rule of law & rdquor;without saying more.
That does not mean, as the non-responses of the minister spokesperson pointed out this Tuesday after the Council of Ministers, that the CNI has not used Pegasus. In fact, no government official could confirm nor deny that this software -or its similar Israeli Candiru– It is in the panoply of the intelligence service: it is a reserved matter whether it is there or not.
Article 5 of the Regulatory Law of the National Intelligence Center says so. Are “classified information, with the degree of secrecy” not only the activities of the CNI, but also “its organization and internal structure, means and procedures, personnel, facilities…”.
It is the article to which the former director of the CNI, lieutenant general, alluded this Wednesday in Congress Felix Sanz Roldan when the media have asked him about Pegasus and he has answered: “I can’t confirm it at all, nor disconfirm it & rdquor ;. And he added that “there is a clear law by which the CNI cannot speak of its means, nor of its procedures, nor of relations with third parties” There is also, however, a non-judicial area where it can reveal it: the Commission of Reserved Expenses of the Congress… not yet constituted.
unlimited information
Beyond the assault with Pegasus on the mobile phones of politicians and activists, which is beginning to be taken for granted, doubts are growing about the limits of this espionage; that is, if he should have looked only at strategic aspects, of the object of the investigation, and leave aside those of private life or other intimacies. A former operational agent of the CNI, and previously an official of the CESID, clarifies that no, because “an investigation of the center is not a judicial investigation. On an intelligence acquisition mission all the information is interesting; all. All information is pertinent. Later, in the analysis phase, it is decided how much and which information is very relevant, relevant or not very relevant”.
However, in other precedents of CNI investigations, the result has been poor despite the supposed availability of means. Using –or not- Pegasus did not prevent Spanish intelligence from not finding the 1-0 polls in 2017.
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However, investigations into alleged terrorist activities by members of the CDR in 2019 have shown how the Civil Guard Information Service, using less conspicuous methods, find out what his targets were talking about including through the Signal app, which became popular with pro-independence activists.
The same source explains that, in the monitoring that different security forces make of a phenomenon that stands as a threat, “looking at mobiles is very important… but not less than have informants and collaborators & rdquor ;.